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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on one type of ex-ante effect of the battle of the 
forms: the incentive to draft reasonable boilerplate terms. It argues that 
the experience with the battle-of-the-forms rule under the CISG 
reinforces what we already know, that existing legal solutions do not 
provide any incentive for the parties to draft reasonable forms. The paper 
suggests that the goal of inducing parties to draft reasonable terms can be 
significantly promoted by a third rule, a variant of the “best-shot” rule 
proposed by Victor Goldberg. Under the version labeled the “reasonable-
shot” rule, the court would resolve the battle of the forms by choosing 
the form that contains the more efficient terms. The paper proposes some 
guidelines how the “reasonable shot” could be identified by the court, 
and argues that there are good reasons to expect that this regime would 
give parties the incentive to draft reasonable terms. In fact, it is plausible 
that under this rule the parties’ forms would converge and the battle of 
the forms would cease to exist. 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law and Economics, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
(omri@umich.edu). This paper is prepared for the Conference on Commercial Law Theory and the 
CISG, Florence, Italy, October 2004. I am grateful to Gillian Hadfield, Roy Kreitner, Alberto Monti, 
Ariel Porat, Ted St. Antoine, Jim White and participants at the conference on Commercial Law Theory 
and the CISG in Florence, Italy, for helpful comments and to Ann McCune and James Miltner for 
valuable research assistance. Financial support from the John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics 
at the University of Michigan is gratefully acknowledged. 
2
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 32 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art32
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The “Battle of the Forms”, one of the oldest problems in modern contract 
law, is widely recognized to be among the most difficult problems for 
contracts doctrine to resolve. In the U.S., the rules governing the battle of 
the forms have been famously labeled “chaos”. 1 Commentators, judges, 
and legislators, continue to view the battle of the forms as a problem that 
has not lent itself to a conceptually satisfactory solution. 2 
 
Improving the law’s solution to the battle of the forms is a task that is 
very much on the agenda of current contract law. The Section governing 
the battle of the forms in the Uniform Commercial Code (“the Code”), 2-
207, is perhaps the most litigated section in contract law, 3 and a 
landmark battlefront during the amendment proceeding of Article 2.4 
Similarly, the enactment of Section 19 of CISG, which governs the battle 
of the forms in international sales of goods, involved a similar prolonged 
debate, bringing to the fore the different conceptual solutions to this 
everyday commercial problem.5 
 
A striking feature of the debates over the battle of the forms is how little 
it has been influenced by the economic analysis of contract law. Apart 
from a few interesting exceptions, the vast literature on the battle of the 
forms—and I’m not referring to the strictly doctrinal inquiries—takes a 
                                                 
1 John Murray labeled the law on the battle of the forms “chaos” and concluded 
recently that the over time it has only exacerbated. See Murray, The Chaos of the Battle 
of the Forms: Solutions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1307 (1986) (hereinafter, “Murray, Chaos I) 
and Murray, The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J. L. & Comm. 
1, 47 (2000) (hereinafter, “Murray, Chaos II);  
2 “Legal science has not yet found a satisfactory way to decide what the parties have 
agreed when they have consummated a transaction on the basis of the routing exchange 
of inconsistent terms.” See JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALES 
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 228 (2d Ed. 19__).  
3 WHITE & SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (4th Ed. 1995); Murray, Chaos II, 
supra note 1, at 4 (Section 2-207 “belies what has become the most complex and 
controversial section of the entire Uniform Commercial Code”) 
4 James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wisc. L.Rev. __ 
(forthcoming). 
5 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
11 1980, 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6264 (1987), 19 I.L.M 668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG], art 19. 
For an account of the legislative debates over Section 19, see Christine Moccia, The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the 
“Battle of the Forms,” 13 Fordham Int’l L. J. 649 (1989).  
3
Ben-Shahar:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
 2 
distinctly ex-post perspective, searching for solutions that would best 
identify the bargain- in-fact of the parties, eliminate undue hardship and 
surprise, avoid arbitrary biases, reduce litigation costs, and provide a fair 
compromise.6 While some of theses perspectives are “economic” in the 
sense that they address efficiency issues (e.g., how efficient are the terms 
that courts can supply7), they primarily take an ex-post efficiency view. 
Their scope is: given the divergence between the parties’ forms, how to 
minimize social waste. 
 
In most other areas of contract law, the main added value of economic 
analysis is the understanding of how legal rules shape the incentives to 
draft contracts and to behave prior to a dispute, that is, the ex-ante 
effects. Remedies, for example, are viewed as incentives to invest and 
perform contracts;8 Gap-filler are viewed as incentives to economize on 
drafting and share information prior to performance;9 and the rules 
governing offer-and-acceptance are viewed as incentives to 
communicate and to invest in the negotiations.10 With few exceptions, 
the literature on the battle of the forms did not accord the ex-ante effects 
equal attention. 
 
The analysis in this paper seeks to contribute to the study of one type of 
incentive that may be influenced by the battle of the forms rules: the 
incentive to draft terms in a way that is more or less self-serving to the 
drafter. True, this is still not the type of primary ex-ante behavior that 
economists are most interested in explaining—e.g., quality of products 
and their price. But even an understanding of how primary economic 
variables are affected by the rule would be incomplete without an inquiry 
as to how the secondary terms—those over which battles of the forms are 
mounted—are designed.  
 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Ostas and Leete, Economic Analysis of Law as a Guide to Post-Communiste 
Legal Reforms: The Case of Hungarian Contract Law, 32 Amer. Bus. L. J. 355, 381-82 
(1995). 
7 See, e.g., Note, Demilitarizing the Battle of the Forms: A Peace Proposal, 1990 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 553, 570. 
8 See, e.g., Edlin, Breach Remedies, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law 174 (P. Newman, Ed., 1998). 
9 E.g., Goetz and Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: an Analysis of the Interactions 
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 261 (1985). 
10  See, e.g.,  Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game 
Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215 (1990). 
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The analysis of the ex-ante effects begins by looking at the time period in 
which the forms—having been drafted earlier—are exchanged between 
the parties. The argument here is not new: both theoretically and 
practically, there is little reason to expect that the battle of the form rules 
would do much to affect the incentive to read the other party’s terms. In 
fact, some new support for this view comes from observations regarding 
the practices under the CISG. The paper identifies an interesting 
ambiguity regarding the resolution of the battle of the forms under the 
CISG, which is consistent only with the premise that form terms are 
utterly disregarded at the contracting stage. Thus, the paper joins 
previous voices that argued that legal policy should focus on the second 
type of incentive—the incentives to draft reasonable terms. 
 
Previous literature recognized that battle of the forms rules could shape 
the incentives to draft form terms. In an insightful article, Baird and 
Weisberg argued that the common law’s formalistic “last-shot” rule 
provides superior incentives for the parties to draft moderate provisions 
that are mutually beneficial. 11 Expecting the some of their counterparts 
would read and reject one-sided terms, parties would draft forms that are 
acceptable to such “readers.” In Section III of the paper, after explaining 
this argument, I will join others before me in doubting whether this 
effect is robust. I will argue that neither of the two standard solutions—
the “last-shot” rule of common law and the “knockout” rule of sales 
law—provides any meaningful incentive to write moderate terms. 
 
Because the incentives to draft moderate terms is the focus of this paper, 
a natural question to ask is whether a different rule might generate better 
incentives than existing solutions. Accordingly, the paper will analyze in 
detail a third and less familiar rule that has the potential to create more 
powerful ex-ante incentives to draft reasonable terms. This rule, the 
“reasonable shot rule”—a variant of which was previously identified in 
an original paper by Victor Goldberg and labeled by him the “best-shot” 
rule12—would require the court to enforce the form containing the more 
reasonable terms. The court cannot concoct its own reasonable 
compromise; nor is it obligated to choose the form that was 
                                                 
11  Douglas Baird and Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: 
A Reassessment of §2-207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217, 1252-57 (1982). 
12 Victor Goldberg, The Battle of the Forms: Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot 
Rule, 76. Ore. L. Rev. 155 (1997) (proposing that courts would choose the fairer of the 
two nonconforming forms.) 
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presumptively “accepted.” Instead, the court must choose one of the two 
forms, that which is more reasonable. This approach resembles the well-
known final-offer arbitration procedure (FOA), often used in labor 
bargaining to determine salaries,13 in which each side submits its 
position and the arbitrator must choose one of the two positions which 
she considers to be closer to the underlying “correct” or ideal resolution. 
This procedure has a well-documented effect of moderating the parties’ 
demands and inducing settlements, and similar dynamics can arise under 
the reasonable-shot rule, providing a powerful inducement for parties to 
draft their forms ex-ante in a more reasonable manner. In fact—this 
argument will be developed below—the incentives to moderate could be 
powerful enough for the parties’ forms to converge, and “in equilibrium” 
the battle of the forms would cease to exist. 
 
However, for the reasonable-shot rule to succeed in inducing parties to 
change their drafting habits and to write reasonable terms, courts must be 
able to apply this standard and identify the more reasonable form in a 
predictable fashion.  Accordingly, the analysis in the paper explores 
various criteria that were not explored before, which may be utilized in 
implementing this standard.  The objective of the analysis here is to 
examine whether courts are institutionally capable of identifying the 
more reasonable terms. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II sets up the different 
solutions to the battle of the forms. The two familiar solutions—the 
“last-shot” rule and the “knockout” rule—are presented briefly; the less 
familiar solution of the “reasonable shot” rule is presented in more detail. 
Section III then discusses the ex ante effects of these three rules, with 
particular emphasis on contract drafting. Section IV concludes. 
 
 
II. THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS: SOLUTIONS 
 
                                                 
13 A notable application of FOA is baseball’s salary arbitration. It is well documented 
that the application of FOA causes parties’ positions to converge, increasing the 
incidence of settlement, and rendering the final outcome more tolerable even for the 
losing side. For accounts of baseball’s FOA experience, see Roger Abrams, THE 
MONEY PITCH : BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY ARBITRATION (1990); John L. 
Fizel, Play Ball: Baseball Arbitration After 20 Years, 20 Disp. Resol. J. 42 (1994). 
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A. The Problem 
The problem known as the battle of the forms is common. Businessmen 
discuss a transaction and agree—orally or through written 
communications—on the performance terms of the deal, e.g., price, 
quantity and description of goods, payment terms, perhaps one or two 
other provisions. In the course of exchanging these communications, or 
in the course of formally memorializing the terms orally agreed upon 
over the phone, the parties exchange forms that contain additional 
“lawyers’ terms” concerning non-performance contingencies, usually 
governing the scope of warranty, limitations on remedies, forum 
selection, and the like. These forms, each of which was pre-drafted by 
legal council in a manner favorable to the party using it, rarely agree. 
The seller’s form, for example, would usually include a boilerplate 
disclaimer of warranties and a significant limitation on damages, 
whereas the buyer’s form would either require some expanded warranty 
or entitle the buyer to a generous measure of consequential damages. 
 
When the battle of the forms is discovered (and adjudicated) prior to 
performance or to any type of conduct that indicates the existence of a 
contract, the question is whether the communications formed a contract. 
Here, the old common law “mirror-image” rule, which established that a 
contract never formed,14 was reformed under the Uniform Commercial 
Code’s (“the Code”) §2-207(1). The Code adopted the view that a 
response can manifest acceptance even if it contains terms that are not 
matching.15 Yet this type of battle of the forms—a pre-performance 
dispute over the existence of a contract—is not very likely to reach 
courts. It is usually a wiser business strategy for a party to seek other 
contracts than to engage in a lawsuit over hypothetical losses suffered 
from the breakdown of a relationship that never actually budded. 
 
The far more common battle of the forms dispute occurs after parties 
have performed the contract, or have otherwise engaged in conduct that 
indicates the existence of a contract. Here, the question is not whether a 
contract exists (it obviously does), but rather what are the contract’s 
terms. Usually the parties have exchanged at least two forms—a 
purchase order by the buyer followed by an acknowledgment or an 
                                                 
14  See Poel v. Brunswick, 110 N.E. 619 (1915) for the strict application of this result, 
but compare to A.B.Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925), which 
adopts a more lenient approach. This rule was adopted by the CISG art. 19(1). 
15 White & Summers, supra note 3, at 8. 
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invoice from the seller (or vice versa: a price quote from the seller 
followed by a purchase order)—only to realize, after delivery and 
payment have been made, that the forms differ with respect to a 
contingent term that, as it happens, turned out to matter a lot. 
Determining the content of the contract is the problem that the law has to 
resolve. 
 
B. The “Last-Shot” Rule 
Under the traditional common law approach known as the “last shot” 
rule, adopted by the CISG, the mirror- image rule implies that each form, 
by virtue of having some different terms relative to the previous form, 
cannot be deemed an acceptance and thus must be regarded as a 
“counter-offer.” A counter-offer is treated in most legal systems as a 
“bundle” of two legal effects: a rejection of the previous offer and the 
making of a new outstanding offer.16 Thus, since each form rejects its 
predecessor and since rejection terminates the offer, the only form that is 
not affirmatively rejected and can potentially be accepted is the last form 
in the sequence, and its terms govern. 
 
This solution, while formally preserving the offer/acceptance module as 
the only template of contract formation, is far from satisfactory. For one, 
contract law is usually stricter in recognizing silence as acceptance of 
terms.17 Nothing in the conduct of the parties indicates that the last shot, 
or any other shot, includes the acceptable of boilerplate terms. Indeed, 
the symmetric passivity of each party regarding the other party’s form 
may be equally consistent with the opposite construction, namely a 
“first-shot” rule.18 Of course, both the first-shot and the last-shot rules 
                                                 
16 See Restatement 2d of Contracts § 39; CISG art. 19(1). 
17 In a merchant-to-merchant context, a silent party is viewed as accepting an offer only 
when he made prior affirmative indications that the terms of the offer are desirable, by 
course of dealings or by soliciting the offer. See Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v. 
Holloway, 214 S.W. 817 (Tenn. 1919) (solicitation of offer ); Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip 
Co., 33 N.E. 495 (Mass. 1893) (course of dealings); James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 
45 Wayne L.Rev. 1693, 1702-03 (2000). 
18 There is non-trivial support to the idea that the party whose response to an offer 
contained non-matching terms, if he did not receive an affirmative acceptance yet 
proceeded to perform, should be deemed to have agreed to the terms in the offer. See, 
e.g., Honnold, supra note 2, at 237-238; Valtrol, Inc. v. General Connectors Corp. 884 
F. 2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1989) (discrepant terms in the acceptance are to be ignored).  In 
practice, under one interpretation of 2-207(2), this “first shot” rule applies any time the 
response includes “different” terms that are not “additional.” See White and Summers, 
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are equally fictitious: in the presence of symmetric non-acceptance, both 
“break the tie” according to the same methodology, namely, both 
construe the chronological order of the forms to be crucial. This 
chronology account, which from the perspective of the parties is mostly 
irrelevant, can have the adverse effect of inducing the parties to keep 
sending counter-forms in the hope of firing the last shot.19 
 
C. The “Knockout” Rule 
Modern sales law has increasingly distanced itself for the common law’s 
last-shot tradition. Recognizing that business entities that exchange 
standard forms rarely read the lawyers’ terms on the back of their 
counterparts’ forms (or, if they read, do not regard silence as acceptance 
of the last shot), the Code sought to eliminate the arbitrariness attached 
to the last shot rule. Surely, if people do not read and compare the back-
of-the-form terms, and if the forms are drafted in advance without regard 
to any particular transaction, the presumption that the first form was 
“rejected” and “expired” and that the last form was “accepted” is 
detached from both common sense and commercial reality. 20 
Accordingly, Section 2-207 of the Code sought to restore greater 
symmetry to a formation process that the common law would otherwise 
irrationally bias towards the last form. It did so utilizing the so-called 
“knockout” rule of Section 2-207: material provisions over which the 
forms disagree are knocked out.21 The existence of conflicting terms is 
taken as mutual rejection, regardless of which was communicated first.  
As a result of this mutual rejection, the contract contains a gap.  
                                                                                                                       
supra  note 3, at 12-14. This interpretation, however, is re jected by most courts. See 
Daicom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1984). 
19 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 12, p. 159 (“the parties have an incentive to jockey 
for position so as theirs is the last shot”); but see Baird and Weisberg, supra  note 11, at 
1252 (arguing that such prolonged battle of the forms is unlikely.) 
20 See also UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 2.22, cmt 
3 (1994) (parties “will normally not even be aware of the conflict between their 
respective standard terms. There is in such cases no reason to allow the parties 
subsequently to […] insist on the application of the terms last sent or referred to.”) 
21 This is, of course, an oversimplification of §2-207’s language, which courts and 
commentators have been laboriously deciphering for the past forty years, but it is 
consistent with the practice followed by most courts. See White & Summers, supra 
note 3, at 10-19. Under amended 2-207, the scope of the knockout result is 
strengthened. As it drafter, James J. White explained, under the amended provision, 
there is no precedence by virtue of timing, “the second record has the same power as 
the first.” See White, supra  note 4, at __. 
9
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Accordingly, the Code supplements the gaps with its usual statutory gap-
filler and, where applicable, with immanent business norms. 
 
The Code’s seemingly neutral solution is, however, far from a split-the-
difference compromise. Once the parties’ conflicting terms drop out, the 
Code’s gap-fillers are often significantly closer to the buyer’s form terms 
than to the seller’s. For example, when the buyer’s warranty term and the 
seller’s disclaimer of warranty drop out, the Code’s gap-fillers include an 
ever-expanding warranty of merchantability and an express warranty 
arising from any affirmations of fact the seller may have made orally in 
the course the parties’ communications (which, under the Code’s weak 
version of the parol evidence rule, are often admissible.) The result is 
therefore quite favorable to the buyer, at times identical to the warranty 
term the buyer’s form included originally. Similarly, when the buyer’s 
remedy terms and the seller’s limitations on remedies drop out, the gap-
fillers are the generous remedies available to the buyer under the Code, 
including consequential damages. 
 
Parties—and sellers in particular—may try to change this knockout/gap-
filling result by drafting a ‘mine and mine only’ clause, usually stating 
that the seller is only willing to transact under his terms, and that the 
buyer’s acceptance of the goods would constitute acceptance of the 
seller’s form terms as well. However, when the buyer’s form includes 
non-matching terms, the seller’s terms still get knocked-out, along with 
the ‘mine and mine only’ clause.22 Like the last-shot rule, there is not 
much either party can do under the Code to escape the effect of the rules 
governing the battle of the forms.23 Unless the seller is willing to prolong 
the negotiation process in attempt to reach express assent (and thereby 
also risk a breakdown of the deal), he must live with the terms as chosen 
by the Code. 
 
D. The Battle of the Forms under the CISG 
The CISG does not provide an innovative solution to the battle of the 
forms. Still, it is worth examining the state of the law under the CISG, as 
it can shed some light on the discussion of the ex-ante effects of the 
rules. Article 19 of the CISG adopts the mirror- image rule: a reply that 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. Etsco, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 410 (Ore. 1984). 
23 But see Farnsworth, Contracts 168 (4th Ed. 2004) (a seller can avoid the knockout 
rule by rejecting the buyer’s form and calling his form a “counter-offer”.) 
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adds new or different material terms is a counter-offer, not acceptance.24 
Article 18(3) of the CISG provides that acceptance may be manifested 
by conduct, such as payment for, or shipment of the goods.25 The 
combination of the mirror- image rule of Article 19 and acceptance by 
conduct of Article 18(3) gives rise to the last-shot rule.26 
 
In practice, however, battles of the forms in contracts for international 
sales of goods do not receive a simple uniform treatment. In actual cases, 
courts refuse to apply the last-shot rule that the convention mandates, 
and instead apply the knockout rule. This defiance occurs, so it seems, 
whenever the contract is adjudicated by courts whose domestic law 
utilizes a version of the knockout rule, such as the U.S. and German 
courts.27 Thus, although the language of the CISG clearly adopts one 
rule, disputes are adjudicated under a different rule, and reach a result 
opposite to the one mandated by the statute. For example, when a seller 
fired the last short with a form disclaiming liability and significantly 
limiting remedies, a court in Germany nevertheless held that since this 
conflicted with the buyer’s term, the implied warranty of merchantability 
                                                 
24 Art. 19(3) lists terms that are presumed to be material, which include warranty, 
disclaimer, force majeure, remedies, and arbitration clauses. Thus, most of terms that 
give rise to battles of the forms are presumed material. 
25 Art. 18(3) provides, in part: “the offeree may indicate assent by performing an act, 
such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of the price.” 
26 See, e.g., Murray, Chaos II, supra note 1, at 44-45; KRITZER, GUIDE TO THE 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 184 (1989) C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, 
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONA SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES 
CONVENTIONS 179 (1987). 
27 For the doctrinal debate whether courts ought to apply domestic law, see Moccia, 
supra note 5, at 673-74 (1989) (if the issue is contract validity, art. 4(a) should apply, 
instructing the court to refer to domestic law.) There are many examples in case law for 
the rejection of the last-shot rule. For an American case, see Chateau Des Charmes 
Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528 (Ninth Cir. 2003); In Germany, the 
Supreme Court recently held that “where the CISG applies, […] according to the 
(probably) prevailing opinion, partially diverging general terms and conditions become 
an integral part of the contract (only) so far as they do not contradict each other; the 
statutory provisions apply to the rest.” See VIII ZR 304/00 (English translation in 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/020109g1.html ); Peter Schlechtriem, 
Battle of the Forms in International Contract Law (English translation in 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem5.html).  
11
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and the statutory remedies apply.28 Similarly, a U.S. court facing a battle 
of the forms contest concerning a forum selection clause applied the 2-
207 knock-out rule while recognizing that the case is governed by the 
CISG, conveniently stating that the CISG would reach the “same 
conclusion” as the Code.29 The resistance in U.S. courts to the CISG’s 
mirror image methodology is quite prevalent.30 Generally, and consistent 
with this loyalty-to-domestic-rules observation, courts rarely cite CISG 
decisions from other countries.31 
 
This uncertainty concerning the prevailing rule can be seen as highly 
problematic. If parties cannot ascertain upfront which rule will be 
applied to a potential battle of the forms, they also cannot predict which 
form or which terms would apply. Don’t parties have to know these 
matters in order to correctly adjust the dickered terms, specifically the 
price? Wouldn’t a seller need to know which warranty term applies to 
the transaction when pricing the goods? Under the CISG, even if the 
seller fired a last shot that included warranty disclaimers, he might end 
up liable under an implied warranty of merchantability, pasted into the 
transaction as a gap-filler by an American court applying the knockout 
rule. 
 
D. The “Reasonable Shot” Rule 
  
1. The Rule 
Arbitrators are well familiar with the procedure of final offer arbitration 
(FOA), which works in the following way. Consider baseball’s salary 
arbitration, where FOA has been widely and successfully used. When a 
player is committed to play for a specific team but the player and the 
team are unable to agree on a salary, each party submits a proposal to the 
arbitrator, who must then choose one of the two proposals—the one that 
is closer to what she considers as the most appropriate salary. The 
arbitrator cannot come up with a third, in-between figure. She may hear 
arguments by the parties why one proposal is more reasonable than 
                                                 
28 VIII ZR 304/00, id.; Larry DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in the International 
Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years fo CISG Jurisprudence, 24 Nw. J. Int’l L. & 
Bus. 299, 352-53 (2004). 
29 Primewood, Inc. v. Roxan GMBH,  WL 1777501 (D.N.D.) 
30 For example, in Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear,  WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y.), the court 
resisted the application of CISG art. 8(3) rule that acceptance of delivery, without 
further communication, manifests acceptance of the terms in the last shot. 
31 DiMatteo et al, supra note 28, at 357. 
12
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another, but must eventually pick one of the two.32 Her decision on how 
much a player ought to be “valued” is based on comparing the player to 
other players, according to the various performance statistics and factors 
specified in the collective bargaining agreement. 
 
The battle of the form can be approached in a similar fashion. In line 
with a proposal first made by Victor Goldberg, 33 under the reasonable-
shot rule the court’s role would be to select the form that contains the 
more reasonable terms.34 Like FOA, the court must choose only between 
the parties’ forms, and cannot devise any “third” option. This is in 
contrast to the knockout rule, where the court can import provisions not 
found in either form. It differs from the first shot and the last shot rules 
since the court has to choose not according to the chronological order of 
forms, but instead in the order of their reasonableness. The court chooses 
the lesser of two “evils”, not the latter of the two. 
 
The determination which form is more reasonable can be broken down 
into the different matters that the forms regulate—warranties, remedies, 
forum selection, etc.—with the more reasonable term coming not always 
from the same form. Under such issue-by-issue procedure, the 
reasonable shot is not necessarily one party’s integral form, but might be 
an assembly of different fragments from the overall totality of the terms 
both parties drafted. As contrasted with the “package” approach, that 
restricts the court to choose one of the forms in its entirety, the issue-by-
issue format reduces the risk that parties face and increases the ability of 
the court to tailor a most reasonable set of provisions.35 And as will be 
argued below, it further sharpens the incentives to draft terms in a 
                                                 
32 For studies of baseball’s FOA, see sources cited in note 13, supra . 
33 See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 166. 
34 The reasonable-shot rule proposed here is somewhat different than the best-shot rule 
proposed by Goldberg, id. Goldberg’s version requires courts to pick the fairer of the 
two forms, whereas the analyzed here requires courts to pick the more reasonable of 
the two forms. While Goldberg, throughout his article, also refers to the form that is 
“more reasonable,” his criterion differs in that it focuses on the fairness of the terms and 
proposes the approach of  the “Golden Rule” to determine comparative fairness. The 
analysis here, in contrast, focuses on the efficiency of the terms and offers different 
criteria to determine comparative efficiency. See text accompanying notes 38-43, infra .. 
35  See Elissa Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in 
Domestic and International Disputes, 10 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 383, 394 (1999). 
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reasonably moderate fashion, because it would be impossible to “sneak” 
an unreasonable term into an otherwise reasonable package.36 
 
2. “More Reasonable Terms” 
Can a court determine which party’s terms are more reasonable? Final-
offer arbitration has been successful in resolving disputes over salaries, 
where each party submits a numeric figure and where market 
comparisons exist to determine which figure is more reasonable.37 Can 
the same technique succeed in resolving disputes over terms that are not 
easily quantifiable, and where exact parameters are not available? 
 
At times, one party’s terms may be so unreasonable that courts would 
find it easy to choose the other party’s form. In fact, they already 
conduct such scrutiny under other doctrines, so no new adjudicatory skill 
would be required.38 Thus, for example, if each party states a different 
arbitration provision, one requiring to arbitrate at a remote location or in 
any fashion that imposes a significant cost and the other picking a natural 
and accessible arbitration forum, it is easy to compare and determine that 
the latter is more reasonable. Or, if each party drafts a different remedy 
provision, one a reasonable estimate of the loss and the other includes a 
limitation that undermines the purpose of remedies, again it is standard 
practice for courts to strike down the one that is less reasonable. 
                                                 
36 Goldberg argues that an all-or-nothing approach, looking at each form in its entirety, 
is essential for assessing the overall fairness of the package. See supra note 12, at 166. 
Arbitrators, however, see merit in the issue-by-issue procedure. See Robert Howlett, 
Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 815, 831-33 (1984). 
37  Even in baseball arbitration—the most successful implementation of FOA—it is not 
clear how to determine the salary the player merits. While there are many useful 
players’ statistics, comparison requires subtle judgment on part of arbitrators, e.g., how 
senior can the comparable group of players be, how to value non-wage or contingent 
wage provisions, which of the many categories of production to use, etc. See Abrams, 
supra  note 13,  157-164. The FOA technique has also been proposed in many other 
areas of dispute that pose difficulties of determining what is the most reasonable term. 
See, e.g., Meth, supra  35 (applying FOA to disputes over contract damages); Christian 
Henrich, Game Theory and Gonslaves: A Recommendation for Reforming Stockholder 
Appraisal Actions, 56 Business Lawyer 697 (2001) (arguing that FOA can apply to 
disputes over share value in freeze -outs.) 
38  For courts’ scrutiny of the reasonableness of limitations on remedies, see, e.g., UCC 
2-719 cmt 1 (“reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be given 
effect”); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wisc. 1978).  For courts’ 
scrutiny of reasonableness of forum clauses, see, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 
407 U.S. 1 (forum selection clause is enforceable unless it is “‘unreasonable’ under the 
circumstances”); see also Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D. 2d 246 (NY 1998). 
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Often, a particular term in one party’s form—say, a term governing the 
procedure for modification—has been followed in prior dealings 
between the parties, elevating its stature to be part of the “agreement,”39 
thus rendering it reasonable. In fact, courts already take such factors into 
account when determining whether an additional term on the counter-
form exhibits a material difference.40 For example, when a limitation of 
remedy clause is deemed reasonable, it is considered immaterial under 2-
207(2).41 So here too, the inquiry necessary to determine the 
reasonableness of a term is one that courts are accustomed to make. 
 
From an efficiency perspective, a term is more or less reasonable 
depending on whether it increases the overall value of the transaction or 
merely shifts value in zero-sum, or negative-sum fashion to its drafter. A 
provision that requires a seller to warrant goods is more reasonable when 
the seller is the most effective monitor of the quality of the goods or if he 
is the least cost avoider or repairer of defects. The same provision is less 
reasonable when it is the buyer who can best protect the asset against 
malfunctions, or who has superior information about nonconformities.42 
Or, a provision that entitles a negligent party to indemnification is 
unreasonable when it undermines the incentives to take care.43 
Generally, terms that serve a productive cost-saving purpose, as opposed 
to merely rent-extraction, are presumptively reasonable. 
 
Additionally, the reasonableness of a term depends on whether or not the 
cost saving that it brings its drafter was shared, ex ante, with the other 
party. When a seller disclaims warranties or limits the buyer’s remedies, 
the term is nevertheless reasonable when the saving from it was shared, 
through a lower price, with the buyer. For example, if a seller disclaims 
                                                 
39  “Agreement” is defined by the Code to include all past practices. See UCC 1-201(3). 
40 See, e.g., GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CISG 172 (1993). 
41 UCC 2-207 cmt. 5 (examples of terms that incorporated in the contract unless 
objected  to include clauses “limiting remedies in a reasonable way”); See also  
Hydraform Prods. Corp. v. American Steel & Alum. Corp., 498 A. 2d 339, 343 (N.H. 
1985). 
42 See Baird & Weisberg, supra  note 11, at 1250. 
43 A similar inquiry is often conducted under UCC 2-207 (2)(b) to determine whether 
terms in the response constitute a material change. The main criterion in this inquiry is 
the “hardship” imposed by the terms in the response.  Thus, for example, courts have 
held that sweeping indemnity clauses impose undue hardship. See Maxon Corp. v. 
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 1986). 
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any liability for goods lost in the course of shipment, this term is more or 
less reasonable depending on whether the buyer was offered the 
opportunity to purchase a more expansive liability coverage but opted for 
the cost-saving alternative. Similar to the law of unconscionability, even 
an extremely pro-seller term can be reasonable if the buyer chose it out 
of a menu of options. 
 
Recall that under the Code’s gap-filling methodology, courts are asked to 
perform an even more exacting task, of picking the reasonable terms on 
their own.  The Code’s gap-fillers are sometimes not much more than 
standards of reasonableness, requiring courts to figure out “reasonable 
duration” of warranties, “fair average quality,” etc. If we believe that 
courts can potentially draft terms that are reasonable, wouldn’t they also 
be able to tell which of the contesting terms is more reasonable? 
Moreover, the issue-by- issue format is a way in which the determination 
of the more reasonable form can be broken down rather than made in a 
0-1 fashion. In situations in which it is difficult to determine which form 
is more reasonable, the court can balance the number of issued decided 
in favor of each party. 
 
3. Examples 
Duration of Warranty. In Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries,44 the 
forms of the parties disagreed over the duration of the warranty for 
electronic boards. The seller’s form contained a 3-month warranty term; 
the buyer’s form contained a warranty with no time limit. The buyer first 
inspected the goods after six months, and upon discovering defects 
rejected the goods and sought remedies. The court knocked out the 
discrepant warranty terms and filled the gap with a warranty for 
“reasonable” time.45 The court did not have to designate a specific 
duration as the most reasonable; it merely decided that the six months it 
took the buyer to invoke the warranty was reasonable. The buyer won. 
 
Under the reasonable-shot rule, the court would have likely reached a 
different resolution, in favor of the seller. The court would not need to 
designate an intermediate duration, nor to evaluate whether six months 
was reasonable. It would only have to determine which of the two terms, 
three months or unlimited duration, is more reasonable. However long is 
                                                 
44 29 F. 3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1994) 
45 The trial court relied on UCC §2-309 which allows buyer to reject non-conforming 
goods within a reasonable time. 
16
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 32 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art32
 15 
the reasonable period for a buyer to test the goods, it must be closer to 
three months than to the unlimited duration the buyer allotted itself. For 
goods that are assembled into a larger system and sold downstream to 
users that the seller cannot monitor, it would unreasonable to require the 
seller to provide free lifetime warranty (or even the 4-year duration 
permitted under the statute of limitation, §2-725). If the boards can first 
be inspected for defects, a reasonable warranty would cover only the 
inspection period.46 A three months period for inspection, while stingy, 
is not unmanageable and thus not unreasonable. 
 
Note, interestingly, that in a dispute like this, the buyer would lose even 
if he attempted the rejection one day past the three-month term. Under 
the current regime, it would suffice for the buyer to show his inspection 
occurred within a reasonable time and, surely, one more day does render 
the rejection period unreasonably long. Under the reasonable-shot rule, 
in contrast, the buyer would not be able to argue that his actual timing is 
reasonable; he would have to show that his contractual term—unlimited 
duration—is more reasonable. Even if his actual conduct is reasonable, a 
party to such a dispute would be unable to overcome the 
unreasonableness of its contractual boilerplate term. 
 
Disclaimer of Warranty. A very common battle of the forms occurs 
between a seller who disclaims all implied and express warranties and a 
buyer who either is silent or includes a warranty of merchantability 
clause similar to UCC 2-314. For example, in Roto-Lith v. Bartlett,47 
seller sold glue to be used by the buyer to seal spinach bags. The glue 
failed. Was the seller’s disclaimer reasonable? Of course, the answer 
depends on various case-specific factors such as the seller’s knowledge 
of the buyer’s needs, the ability of the buyer to test the glue or to 
anticipate difficulties in using it, how the glue was used, etc’. The point  
here is not that one party’s term is universally more reasonable; rather, 
the point is that reasonableness can be ascertained by looking at factors 
that are verifiable at trial. In that case, commentators perceive the 
disclaimer by this seller as reasonable.48 Notably, in writing on this case, 
Grant Gilmore opined that “it would have been outrageous to have 
                                                 
46  See UCC 2-607(3). 
47  297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). 
48  See Baird and Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1250-51, for analysis of the Roto-Lith 
case and the factors that suggest that a disclaimer of warranty is reasonable. 
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saddled the seller with warranties which (as the buyer knew) he had 
expressly (and quite reasonably) disclaimed.”(Emphasis added)49 
 
Arbitration. What about the othe r common battle of the forms, where 
one party’s form (usually the seller’s) includes an arbitration term and 
the other party is either silent on forum selection or includes a different 
arbitration term? Arbitration has many advantages that normally make it 
a reasonable, cost-saving choice. But it is also occasionally designed to 
prevent buyers from obtaining a practical remedy. When, say, a filing fee 
is unreasonable given the stakes, or when the arbitration forum is 
geographically inaccessible, or when either the procedure or the 
substantive rules of the arbitration forum exclude a reasonable remedy, 
courts can—and already often do—strike down the arbitration clause as 
unreasonable.50 To show that the arbitration clause is unreasonable, a 
party can identify an existing alternative that is more accessible and 
reasonable. In the same way that negligence in torts can be demonstrated 
by focusing on untaken precautions, unreasonableness in contract 
drafting can be shown by reference to un-drafted alternatives.  
 
Consequential Damages. Finally, consider a battle between the seller’s 
term which limits damages for defective goods to not exceed the contract 
price versus the buyer’s term which expands damages to include all 
consequential losses. Neither of these terms is first-best. The seller’s 
term, by excluding all expectation losses, sets damages too low; the 
buyer’s term, by including unforeseeable and unpreventable components 
of the loss, sets damages too high. Courts cannot realistically conduct a 
direct comparison of social welfare under these two terms. However, the 
buyer’s term may be deemed reasonable if some of the idiosyncratic 
facts that affect his losses were communicated to the seller explicitly. An 
unread boilerplate term in the buyer’s form is not adequa te 
communication; an oral statement concerning the buyer’s needs is. Thus, 
the buyer would lose because he did not choose the reasonable medium 
to alert the seller to his special circumstances and thus did not give the 
seller an opportunity to price the added liability. 
 
                                                 
49 Letter of Grant Gilmore to Robert Summers, cited in White, supra note 4, at __. 
50 See Brower v. Gateway 2000, 247 A.2d 247, 255 (NY 1998); Matter of Teleserve 
Sys. [MCI Telecommunications Corp.], 230 A.D.2d 585, 594 (NY 1997). 
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III. ANALYSIS OF EX-ANTE EFFECTS 
 
A. Incentives to Read 
The first type of incentive that may be affected by the rules governing 
the battle of the forms is the incentive to read the fine print in the other 
party’s form. Of course, reading terms in standard form contracts is 
costly. It is plausible, in fact quite likely, that the social value of such 
increased incentive does not justify the cost. But even without 
conducting any cost-benefit analysis of the incentive to read,51 it is not 
clear if there can be much variance across the different rules with respect 
to the incentives to read. 
 
Consider first the last-short rule. Here is a plausible conjecture: under the 
last-shot rule, parties would have a more powerful incentive to read the 
terms prior to performance.52 If, say, the seller fired the last shot, the 
buyer—realizing that the seller may try to sneak in terms unfavorable to 
buyer—would have the incentive to read the terms in the seller’s invoice 
before silently accepting them, to verify that he is willing to proceed 
under the seller’s terms. He might decide, after reading, that he is better 
off taking his business elsewhere, or perhaps insisting on some offsetting 
concessions from the seller.53 In contrast, under the knockout rule, 
neither party would have such an incentive to read. Under this rule, each 
party expects that even if the other party drafted selfish terms, they will 
drop out and would not be part of the contract. Thus, there is no gain to 
reading and raising havoc upfront. 
 
It is far from clear that the last-shot rule would indeed provide the added 
incentive to read. The actual ritual of contracting—of exchanging forms 
                                                 
51 For such analyses in a consumer context, see Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine: The 
Duty to Read Fine Print in Standard Form Contracts, 21 Rand J. Econ 518 (1990); 
Clayton Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wisc. L.Rev. __ 
(forthcoming). 
52 See, e.g., Ostas and Leete, supra  note 6, at 378 (1995) (last shot rule “provides an 
incentive for business actors to carefully read and discuss al the contract terms”); Baird 
and Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1257 (“the seller knows that at least some buyers will 
be careful enough to read the seller’s form.”)  
53 The premise that at least some buyers have the incentive to read underlies the 
economic analysis of consumer standard form contracts. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.Rev. 630, 638 (1979); Kornhauser, Unconscionability in 
Standard Forms, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1151 (1976). 
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and accepting shipment—is conducted by “underlings” of seller and 
buyer who sit in their offices with a telephone and a stack of form 
contracts drafted by their lawyers.54 In large firms doing hundreds of 
transactions, these contracting agents do not have the institutional 
training nor the authority to read and dicker with the lawyers’ terms, and 
they rarely have the capacity to trade away a particular boilerplate term 
for a more favorable price.55 In fact, they often don’t even read or 
remember their own boilerplate terms.56 Are these the agents who are 
going to read their counterparts’ fine print terms? Even if an innovative 
organization were to authorize its sales agents to read and negotiate the 
warranty and arbitration terms, these agents would likely be dealing with 
counterpart agents who are only authorized to deal on a take- it-or-leave-
it basis. In any event, reading is futile.57 
 
One may nevertheless wonder whether a change in the legal regime, say 
from the knockout rule to the last-shot rule, or perhaps to the reasonable-
shot rule, would bring about a change in contracting practices and would 
challenge more organizations to train their sales and purchasing agents to 
read, process, and adjust boilerplate terms. Aside from the well-
rehearsed observations concerning the economic value of unread 
contracts in a mass-transaction economy, there is little reason to expect 
that such an effect could take place. For one, there are existing 
jurisdictions that have long applied a last-shot regime and yet do not 
exhibit a more prevalent practice of reading printed terms.58 And if 
parties don’t read the last shot under the last-shot rule, there is even less 
reason to expect that they would do so under any other rule, particularly 
the reasonable-shot rule. Apathy to each other’s boilerplate terms is not a 
                                                 
54 White & Summers, supra note 3, at 6-7. 
55 See, generally, Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study , 28 Amer. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); Murray, Chaos I, supra note 1, at 
1317, 1373; Gregory Travalio, Clearing the Air after the Battle: Reconciling Fairness 
and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to UCC 2-207, 33 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 327, 330 
(1983).  
56 See Macaulay, id., at 59. 
57 See Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 Mich. L.Rev. 
2678, 2699-2700 (2000) (reporting survey results that confirms that parties rarely read 
the form terms prior to the transaction.) 
58 See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General: Formation and Validity of Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, 10 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law 29, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128 (1977) (“the employees of both parties will rarely, if ever, read 
and compare the printed terms. All that is of importance to them are the terms which 
have been filled in on the forms”) 
20
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 32 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art32
 19 
result of a calculated conclusion that those term matter more or less 
depending on the legal regime. Rather, it is a manifestation of the 
attitude that it is not the fine print that matters, but the bargain in fact 
between the parties. 
 
This conclusion—that agents are not sensitive at all to the legal rules 
governing the battle of the forms—is reinforced by the experience with 
the battle of the forms under the CISG. As noted above, while the CISG 
clearly designates the last-shot rule, in practice courts often apply the 
knockout rule. There is no indication, however, that any of this 
ambiguity concerning the law affects in any way the contracting 
practices of the parties. It might be puzzling, how do parties enter 
contracts for sales of international goods without the ability to predict 
which rule would govern the battle of the forms and which terms would 
prevail. Isn’t the battle of the forms rule as important to the parties as it 
is to legal scholars and reformers? Apparently, this rule—and the fate of 
the boilerplate terms that the parties exchange—does not seem essential 
to the businessmen and their agents who negotiate the dickered terms. At 
the time of exchange of communications and performance of the 
contract, the divergence in boilerplate terms is often neither addressed 
nor recognized, and the agents behave as if they are not concerned with 
the potential dispute resolution rules or remedies. Those who are part to 
the deal are interested in assent over the performance terms. For these 
agents, the fate of the terms in fine print is, at the time of contracting, 
insignificant. 
 
Accordingly, if the rules governing the battle of the form can have any 
incentive effects, they must be aimed at the lawyers of both parties, 
operating in the background in drafting the forms. These are the parties 
who indirectly “negotiate” the boilerplate terms, who care about their 
contingent application, and who can anticipate the impact of the battle of 
the forms rules on the enforceability of these terms. Indeed, hornbooks 
are replete with suggestions for practitioners on how to draft their 
contracts given the different consequences that courts might attach to 
various drafting techniques.59 That is, lawyers who draft the fine print 
are the “true” rivals in the battle of the forms. A successful solution to 
the battle of the forms would give these role players an incentive to reach 
mutual assent—to design forms and boilerplate terms that agree. 
                                                 
59 See White & Summers, supra note 3, at 31. 
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B. Incentives to Draft 
 
1. The Last-Shot Rule versus the Knockout Rule 
The battle of the forms is the result of a reality in which many of the 
“legal” aspects of a deal are not affirmatively negotiated. Because the 
principals negotiating the deal are interested only in the performance 
terms, and because the organizational structure of each party usually 
requires it to utilize forms to memorialize the terms of the deal, there is 
an opportunity for both sides to insert one-sided terms which would 
likely escape the other party’s scrutiny and would, with some likelihood, 
secure a benefit. In fact, not only is there an opportunity to use one-sided 
form terms, there is a clear incentive to do so. The risk that these 
boilerplate terms will be detected and influence the other party’s 
willingness to deal is usually minor. 
 
How do existing solutions to the battle of the forms fair with respect to 
the incentives to draft? Here is another conjecture: under the last-shot 
rule, parties would have a more powerful incentive to draft reasonable 
terms.60 At the drafting stage, each party would recognize that the more 
one-sided its form, the more likely is the other party to reject it and 
respond with a counter offer. Thus, to reduce the chance of rejection, an 
offeror would want to draft more moderate terms, to the mutual interest 
of both parties.61 
 
It is unlikely, however, that this “moderation” conjecture is robust.62 For 
one, it is based on the premise that a recipient reads the terms of the offer 
and decides, ad-hoc, after evaluating the substance of these terms, 
whether or not to respond with its own counter-offer. But, as argued 
above, parties rarely read the boilerplate terms in the forms, not even 
their own. The practice of sending a counter-form—a purchase order, 
invoice, and acknowledgment—is a matter of standard business practice, 
                                                 
60 See, Baird and Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1252-57 (“under the mirror-image rule, 
each party has an incentive to hypothesize the terms that the parties would have settled 
upon had they dickered over them.”)  
61 Some have argued that even if terms are read only by a fraction of transactors, there 
is enough incentive for drafters to draft more balanced terms. See, e.g., Schwartz & 
Wilde, supra  note 53, at 638; but see, Gillette, supra note 51, section II.B, for analysis 
of some weaknesses in this argument. 
62 For another skeptical account, see Goldberg, supra note 12, at 164-5. 
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which Judge Posner called “a thoughtless use of boilerplate form.”63 
Recall: the fundamental business logic of using standard forms is to save 
the transaction cost of customized terms and of complex precontractual 
adjustments. It is the same business logic that suggests that even if one 
were to moderate its own terms, this would not affect the terms in the 
response. And without such benefit, the strategy of moderation is not 
likely to be employed. The overwhelming incentive under the last-shot 
rule is to draft self- interested forms and to try and sneak them in as late 
as possible prior to performance. Indeed, parties often perform the 
transaction while continuing to send forms back and forth, making it 
further difficult to ascertain who fired the last shot. 
 
Similarly, under the Code’s knockout rule, parties do not have any 
incentive to moderate their standard form term. From the buyer’s 
perspective, the knock out result is quite desirable, as it opens the door to 
the Code’s pro-buyer gap-fillers such as warranties, consequential 
damages, a limited list of sellers’ excuses, and no arbitration. For the 
buyer, then, the risk of engaging in a battle of the forms is not much of a 
deterrent: he is often equally happy to be governed by the Code’s gap-
fillers as by his own form provisions. He has no incentive draft terms in 
a way that might avoid a battle of the forms. For the seller, in contrast, 
the battle of the forms is more costly. To avoid the dilemma of either 
accepting the buyer’s form or knocking it out and importing the Code’s 
gap fillers, the seller might try to induce the buyer to accept the seller’s 
terms, perhaps by drafting a less one-sided form, more acceptable to the 
buyer. But as long as the buyer has nothing to lose by using its own 
form, there is no reason for the seller to expect that any restraint on his 
part would prevent a battle of the forms, and thus no clear reason to draft 
moderate provisions. As White & Summers soberly conclude, if a seller 
wants to limit liability and cannot get the buyer to agree, all he can do 
“ex-ante,” after having an extra martini every night, is to shrink the 
capitalization of the firm.64 
 
In sum, the reason that the battle of the forms remains an acute problem 
under both the last-shot and the knockout rules, and that parties regularly 
continue to draft forms in a self-serving manner, is that these regimes do 
not provide any incentive for the parties to draft reasonable terms. When 
the lawyers draft the boilerplate provisions, either generally to fit all 
                                                 
63 Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1994). 
64 White & Summers, supra note 3, at 31. 
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transactions or specifically tailored to a particular deal, they have no 
motivation to draft terms that are mutually beneficial. Rather, the intra-
organizational pressure is to think one-sidedly. 65 Occasionally, when 
these selfish terms are exposed and turn out to be deal breakers in the 
bargaining, special accommodations can be made. But in the majority of 
situations, the terms  are only discovered ex post facto, at which point 
they can only benefit their drafter.  
 
2. The Reasonable-Shot Rule 
The reasonable-shot regime attaches a substantial cost to the strategy of 
drafting unreasonably self-serving forms, and it potentially provides 
incentives for the parties’ forms to converge.66 When parties expect the 
court to enforce their terms only if they are more reasonable than the 
terms of their counterparts, there is a powerful incentive to draft these 
terms in a reasonable, less one-sided manner. This is independent of 
whether a party expects its form to be accepted by the other party, or 
even to be read by the other party. The reason a party would be induced 
to draft terms that are more balanced and reasonable is not the 
expectation to be rewarded for it in the negotiation stage, nor the 
expectation that it would translate into higher willingness to pay by the 
other party. It is the expectation that the more reasonable the form, the 
more likely are its terms to be enforced, ex-post. The incentive this rule 
gives is founded on the recognition that the true battle-of-the-forms 
interaction is between the drafters of both forms, the two “legal 
departments” that don’t necessarily negotiate with each other. Each 
drafter would be induced to change its drafting strategy because of the 
fear that its counterpart would do the same and come out with the upper 
hand, in the contest over which form more reasonable.67 
 
Eventually, it can be imagined that the dynamics under this rule are such 
that a race to the middle would take place.68 Even if each party only 
                                                 
65 See Avery Katz, On the Use of Practitioner Surveys in Commercial Law Research, 
98 Mich. L.Rev. 2760, 2769-70 (2000) (discussing intra-firm tensions between lawyers 
and sales agents that might explain the one-sided drafting of the forms.) 
66 See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 166 (the “best-shot” rule gives each side an incentive 
to move towards the center.) 
67 In an interview, some in-house counsel noted that best-shot rule might cause contract 
drafters to rethink their current drafting strategies. See Keating, supra  note 57, at 2711. 
68 The race to the middle under a FOA procedure is well recognized. See, e.g., Stern et 
al., FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION: THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE 
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wants to draft terms that are incrementally more reasonable than the 
other party’s terms, it also realizes that the other party would try to do 
the same. It is a familiar equilibrium in contests that have these dynamics 
for both parties to align themselves in the middle.69 In the present 
context, the more predictable the court’s view of what constitute 
reasonable terms, the closer the parties’ terms would be to it, and the 
practice of drafting biased terms would cease. And if the courts’ position 
on reasonableness is known with certainty, the equilibrium involves both 
parties drafting identical forms, representing a reasonable majoritarian 
compromise. The solution to the battle of the forms could have the 
paradoxical effect of eliminating the battle of the forms from arising in 
the first place. At the very least, it brings the parties forms closer 
together, with each party being less satisfied with its own form but more 
satisfied with the opponent’s form.70 
 
The “race to the middle” described above depends, of course, on whether 
parties can anticipate what courts would view as a reasonable “middle.” 
In salary arbitration, this convergence may fail when parties are 
uncertain about the arbitrator’s preferred settlement.71 The greater the 
uncertainty, the weaker the incentive to submit a more reasonable 
position. Still, even in these circumstances, where the rule does not 
guarantee convergence, it provides more powerful incentives for 
moderation than other rules. The reason is simple: under this rule, a 
party’s decision to draft a concession, however costly it is when the 
concession is adopted into the contract relative to a contract without such 
a concession, is at least partially offset by the new benefit, in terms of the 
greater chance of winning the battle of the forms. When this endogenous 
benefit is accounted for, even significant concessions have only minor 
impact on this party’s expected profit.72  
                                                                                                                       
BARGAINING 144 (1975) (providing empirical evidence that FOA moderates the 
submissions of opposing part ies);  
69 ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMICS 23-26 (1992) (when 
parties have perfect information, their positions converge). 
70 For example, when a dispute between the IRS and Apple Computers over tax debt 
exceeding $100 million was resolved by FOA, both parties declared themselves 
winners. See After Successful Use of Baseball Arbitration, Apple, IRS Both Declare 
Themselves Winners, 11 Alternatives to High Cost Litigation 163 (1993). 
71 See Steven J. Brams, NEGOTIATION GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO 
BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION 71-75 (1990) 
72 See Jay Coleman et al, Covergence or Divergence in Final-Offer Arbitraion in 
Professional Baseball , 31 Industrial Relations 238, 244 (1993). 
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Nevertheless, the more predictable the reasonableness standard, the more 
likely are parties to race to the middle. If there is a broad spectrum of 
what parties’ perceive as reasonable (or, what they believe courts would 
view as reasonable), the parties would be relatively safer in drafting 
terms at conflicting ends of this spectrum. As the spectrum narrows, the 
reasonable shot rule would generate more powerful incentives for the 
parties’ forms to converge. Thus, the critical factor for this rule to 
succeed is the ability to predict the court’s position. This, of course, 
depends on whether courts’ determination of what constitute reasonable 
terms is principled and informed. If comparative efficiency is the 
yardstick utilized to determine reasonableness, I highlighted above 
several factors that should be looked at, and argued that courts are in fact 
already familiar with the relevant inquiries.  
 
Of course, for the reasonable shot rule to generate predictable outcomes, 
it is not enough that courts follow a well-defined methodology in 
comparing the parties’ forms, they must also have the information and 
institutional capacity to conduct accurate comparisons. Given the 
existing experience, it is probably easy to come up with examples for 
battles of forms in which it is impossible to determine comparable 
reasonableness. On the basis of these examples, it would be tempting to 
conclude that courts do not have the information necessary to compare 
reasonableness and that the rule would lead to indeterminacy, rather than 
to convergence. However, we should keep in mind that the difficulty in 
determining reasonableness is endogenous to the legal regime. Under the 
reasonable shot rule, parties would have a greater incentive submit 
evidence to show that their terms are more reasonable. In the same way 
that baseball’s FOA introduced new ways of measuring players’ 
contribution to their teams’ success, such that did not exist before the 
procedure was launched (and recall: baseball already had many statistical 
ways of measuring productivity),73 the rule can induce parties to provide 
information that would help measure the reasonableness of terms.74 For 
                                                 
73 In baseball arbitration, FOA “focuses the parties’ presentations [so that] each side 
must explain to the tribunal why the player is worth more or less than the midpoint. 
[Experts] have devised complex formulae […] to describe a player’s contribution to his 
club’s success.” See Abrams, supra  note 13, at 156-7. 
74 In the context of appraisal of minority share value in freeze-outs, Chancellor Allen  
of Delaware discussed the merits of FOA in improving the quality of information 
available to courts. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 259 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990); Henrich, supra note 37, at 701, 715.  
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example, courts might learn that a particular provision is reasonable in 
light of intra- firm concerns, information currently deemed irrelevant.  
 
Further, even if there would be some initial uncertainty as to what courts 
regard more reasonable terms, over time a body of jurisprudence and 
precedents would accumulate and make subsequent adjudication easier 
and more predictable.75 Since parties on the same side of the transaction 
divide use similar terms, the different types of substantive battles that 
arise is limited. This is particularly true in e-commerce.76 Whether it is a 
battle between warranties versus disclaimers, limitations versus 
consequential remedies, arbitration, or any other common frontier, the 
patterns of dispute are fairly limited and, as happened in baseball 
arbitration, the parties can learn to anticipate courts’ decisions.77 
 
Thus, the incentive to draft reasonable terms under the reasonable-shot 
rule could emerge gradually. Initially, when there is still much 
uncertainty among transactors as to what terms are more or less 
reasonable, this regime will not generate convergence. But over time, as 
the information courts acquire improves and as accumulating case law 
identifies categories of unreasonable terms, parties would learn not to 
draft certain one-sided terms. These dynamics would potentially persist 
as long as the criteria for reasonableness are coherent and are capable of 
yielding deterministic outcomes.  
 
 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARK 
 
                                                 
75 See Baird & Weisberg, supra  note 11, at 1246 (arguing that disputes over the 
meaning of “material,” while frequent in the early years of the Code, would decrease as 
the likely outcome of litigation becomes predictable). 
76 Under increasingly prevalent technologies, contract terms are standardized and 
electronically tagged, often exchanged between computers. See, e.g., Margaret Jane 
Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125, 1130 (2000). 
77 In baseball arbitration, when FOA was initially invoked, arbitrators did not have a 
clear reference on how wages should correspond to statistical measures of performance 
and how to relatively weigh the different factors. For example, arbitrators had a 
difficulty applying factors that are more subjective, such as the player’ crowd appeal or 
spontaneity. It is only over time, with the accumulation of precedents and comparable 
cases, that the formula for reasonable wage became more obvious and that a 
quantitative yardstick became known. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 165. 
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Even if the analysis in this paper is correct and the reasonable-shot rule 
provides superior incentives to draft efficient boilerplate forms, there 
remains a conceptual problem that the paper did not address. Recall that 
for the reasonable shot rule to succeed, courts must be able to determine 
which terms are more reasonable. But if courts are capable of doing so, 
why not simply have the courts substitute the parties’ forms with what 
they deem as most reasonable? Why not endorse a regime in which the 
most reasonable terms govern, dictated by court regardless of whether 
one party happened to draft a form that reflects them? That is, instead of 
reaching this outcome indirectly, implementing it gradually through an 
incentive scheme that requires parties to guess the courts’ position, 
courts can regulate it directly and immediately (and allow parties to opt 
out of it only through consented form.) 
 
This question implicates a more fundamental observation concerning the 
Code’s gap-filling methodology. In a sense, under the existing knockout 
rule courts already do as suggested, substitute the parties non-matching 
terms with the perceived most reasonable gap-fillers. The problem, as I 
argued in the paper, is that these gap-fillers are not quite so reasonable. 
Being so rigidly favorable to buyers, the Code’s gap-fillers do not mimic 
a hypothetical bargain—they do not represent what parties who want to 
maximize their surplus would rationally agree upon. The problem, then, 
is not with the battle-of-the-forms rule that knocks out both parties’ 
terms, but with the content of the gap-fillers that take their place. 
 
Still, even if the Code’s gap-fillers were more efficient and better 
tailored to substitute the parties’ conflicting terms, the reasonable-shot 
regime could be advantageous. For one, it places a less exacting burden 
on courts: picking the more reasonable term is easier than drafting the 
most reasonable one from scratch, especially so when one party’s term is 
distinctly unreasonable. Moreover, the reasonable-shot rule strengthens 
contract as an institution privately regulated by the parties, rather than 
publicly dictated by the court. Even if the term governing the transaction 
is the same as it would be under the gap-filling regime, under the 
reasonable shot rule the enforced term is privately tailored. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the reasonable shot rule encourages parties to 
help courts in identifying the reasonable terms. By drafting terms into 
their standard forms and by arguing ex-post why their terms ought to be 
enforced, parties provide courts with a stronger factual basis for the 
determination, potentially improving its accuracy. 
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